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1. INTRODUCTION: RACE, STRUCTURALISM, AND INTERRACIAL FAMILIES

In February 2012, HBO premiered a documentary film entitled The
Loving Story, which traced the experiences of Mildred and Richard Loving,
the interracial couple from Virginia who famously challenged that state's
antimiscegenation law in the 1960s.' The film, the only documentary of its
sort, was remarkable, in part because it did more than just focus on the
litigation that led up to the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision
in Loving v. Virginia,2 which invalidated the Virginia antimiscegenation
statute and held that laws "restricting the freedom to marry solely because of
* Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. I am grateful to Professor Onwuachi-Willig and the
editors of The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice for including me in this colloquium. I thank my
fellow contributers to the colloquium, as well as Michelle Adams and Elise Boddie for helpful
comments on this essay. Finally, I am thankful to Fordham Law School, Will Fullwood, and
Ramona Ortega for critical research support.
I.
THE LOVING STORY (Icarus Films 2011 ). I was fortunate to serve as one of several scholar
advisors on this documentary.
2.

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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racial classifications violate the central meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause." 3 The film uses compelling narration and footage of interviews with
people from the small Virginia town from which Mildred and Richard
hailed--one in which cross-racial intimacy was tolerated, if not acceptedas well as pictures of the couple's children to provide an intimate glimpse of
the Loving's family life and context. 4 It offers a unique perspective on the
social and legal systems that both brought Mildred and Richard together and
threatened to tear them apart.5
In legal scholarship, such a broad view of the forces and systems
affecting the interracial couples at the center of landmark cases is all too
rare. Of course, we know something about the practical effects of
antimiscegenation laws on couples like the Lovings, who were effectively
exiled from Virginia and forced to live for years in the neighboring District
of Columbia in order to keep their family intact. 6 We also have good
information about the structure, terms, 7 and regulatory effect of
antimiscegenation laws where racial categories, 8 but also notions of

3.
Id. at 12. The decision also invalidated Virginia's law on due process grounds. See id. For
more on this element of the Court's decision, see R.A. Lenhardt, Perez v. Sharp and the Limits of
Loving, in LOVING V. VIRGINIA IN A POST-RACIAL WORLD 73 (Kevin Noble Maillard & Rose Cuison
Villazor eds., 2012); R.A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, and
the Fightfor Same-Sex Marriage,96 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (2008).
4.
See Alessandra Stanley, Scenes from a Marriage that Segregationists Tried to Break Up,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2012, http://tv.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/arts/television/the-loving-story-an-hbo
-documentary.html?_r=0. For personal observations of the Lovings' relationship and the area from
which they hailed, see Robert A. Pratt, Crossing the Color Line: A Historical Assessment and
PersonalNarrative of Loving v. Virginia, 41 How. L.J. 229 (1998).
5.

See Stanley, supra note 4.

6.
See generally PETER WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT I LOVE MY WIFE: RACE,
MARRIAGE, AND LAW-AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2002) (discussing, inter alia, implications of the
law banning Mildred and Richard from living as married couple in Virginia).
7.
See RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND
ADOPTION 214-43 (2003) (discussing antimiscegenation laws and categories); RACHEL F. MORAN,
INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE 17-28 (2001) [hereinafter
REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE] (discussing, inter alia, racial categories deployed in
antimiscegenation laws); R.A. Lenhardt, Forgotten Lessons on Race, Law, and Marriage:The Story
of Perez v. Sharp, in RACE LAW STORIES 350-52 (Devon W. Carbado & Rachel F. Moran eds.,
2008) [hereinafter Lenhardt, The Story ofPerez v. Sharp].
8.
See, e.g., WALLENSTEIN, supra note 6, at 133-46 (discussing antimiscegenation laws as
efforts to define the color line); Reginald Oh, Interracial Marriage in the Shadows of Jim Crow:
Racial Segregation as a System of Racial and Gender Subordination,39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1321,
1329-39 (2006) (discussing, inter alia, the role of antimiscegenation law in reinforcing white
supremacy and racial categories); Rose Cuison Villazor, The Other Loving: Uncovering the Federal
Government's Regulation of Marriage, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1361 (2011) (discussing treatment of
interracial marriages involving white G.I.s from the United States and Japanese women under United
States military law); Leti Volpp, American Mestizo: Filipinos and Antimiscegenation Law in
California, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 795 (2000) (discussing, inter alia, efforts to categorize Filipinos
under California law).
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intimacy and the normative family are concerned. 9 What we do not yet have
is sufficient insight into the legal mechanisms and systems that, alongside or
independent of such laws, have operated to shape the experiences of
interracial couples and families in the United States. We do not have a full
account of the structural elements that limit interracial intimacy, families,
and parenting in the United States. Fortunately, Angela Onwuachi-Willig's
wonderful new book, According to Our Hearts: Rhinelander v. Rhinelander
and the Law of the Multiracial Family, begins to close this gap in legal
scholarship.' 0 Highlighting the experiences of black-white gay and straight
couples and families, it focuses on the ways in which law and society more
generally "work together to define families and their rights and opportunities
by race-especially when those families are multiracial." II
According to Our Hearts' initial chapters tell the story of Alice Jones, a
woman of color, and Leonard Rhinelander, a wealthy, white socialite, who
briefly found love in 1920s New York, only to lose it in the most
sensationalized way. 12 Leonard, bowing to pressure from a wealthy father
unhappy with his mixed-race marriage, filed an annulment suit seeking to
invalidate his brief marriage to Alice on grounds that she had, essentially,
engaged in "racial fraud"' 13 by lying about an issue at the very heart of their
relationship-her racial identity. " A very public, media-intensive trial
ensued, with the primary goal of determining Alice's race and how apparent
it should have been to Leonard.' 5
Other texts have explored the Rhinelander case and the ugly roots of
white supremacy in the northern United States that it helped to reveal. 16

See generally LOVING V. VIRGINIA IN A POST-RACIAL WORLD (Kevin Noble Maillard &
9.
Rose Cuison Villazor eds., 2012) (collecting essays on Loving and its impact on notions of race and
the normative family); REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE, supra note 7, at 61 75 (discussing
antimiscegenation laws as mechanisms for "defining the boundaries of sexual and marital
propriety"); Carlos A. Ball, The Blurring of the Lines: Children and Bans on Interracial Unions and
Same-Sex Marriages,76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2733 (2008) (discussing the impact of antimiscegenation
law on children and notions of family); Kevin Noble Maillard, The Multicultural Epiphany of
Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2709 (2008) (discussing the impact of antimiscegenation law on
children and notions of family).
10.
ANGELA ONWUACHI-WILLIG, ACCORDING TO OUR HEARTS: RHINELANDER V.
RHINELANDER AND THE LAW OF THE MULTIRACIAL FAMILY (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript) (on file
with author).
11.

Id.at8.

12.

Seeid.at27-120.

13.

Id. at 73.

14.

Id. at 35-36.

15.

See id. at 4.

16.
See, e.g., EARL LEWIS & HEIDI ARDIZONNE, LOVE ON TRIAL: AN AMERICAN SCANDAL IN
BLACK AND WHITE (2001); ELIZABETH SMITH-PRYOR, PROPERTY RITES: THE RHINELANDER TRIAL,
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Arguably none, however, has achieved as complete an account of the legal
proceedings that engulfed Alice and Leonard, and essentially ended their
brief marriage. Onwuachi-Willig works as an archeologist might, unearthing
original case materials to reveal a rare and precious piece of legal history.
What emerges is a detailed anatomy of this underexplored case. Careful
analysis of items such as the trial transcript and the couple's marriage
affidavit provides readers with insight into the legal and social pressures that
led Leonard to claim that his wife had misrepresented her race to him and,
among other things, forced a humiliated Alice to submit her naked body to
the all-white and male jury in order to litigate her blackness.17
This foundation enables Onwuachi-Willig to explore important issues
and themes concerning twenty-first century mixed-race couples and families
in later parts of According to Our Hearts. Perhaps foremost among these is
the concept of "placelessness.' 8 Onwuachi-Willig suggests that, even as
more and more people choose "according to their hearts" to enter into loving
relationships across racial lines, interracial intimacy remains a context in
which place or location still matter very much. This is obviously so in the
area of residential housing where, if segregation has not prevented people of
opposite races from ever even meeting, interracial couples often find
19
themselves combating discrimination and other exclusionary measures.
But it is arguably also true in law. Onwuachi-Willig makes the powerful
observation that, rather than directly taking account of interraciality,
20
antidiscrimination law presumes the monoraciality of couples and families.
Existing statutes offer clear protections for individuals who might face
discrimination on the basis of their own racial identity, but make no
provisions whatsoever for discriminatory treatment at "the intersection of
race and family," on grounds of one's partner or the interracial character of
their relationship.2 '
While Onwuachi-Willig admittedly does not explicitly champion a
structure-based inquiry, this Article endeavors to show that this discussion of
placelessness and other aspects of her book lend themselves nicely to a
discussion of structural racism and its impact on interracial families.
Structuralism-a focus on "the cumulative effect of institutional structures
and systems on outcomes for institutions, groups, and individuals"-has a
PASSING, AND THE PROTECTION OF WHITENESS (2009).

17.

For a discussion of litigating race, and whiteness in particular, see generally Ariela Gross,

Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Detennination in the Nineteenth Century South, 108 YALE

L.J. 109 (1998) (discussing trials in which individuals litigated racial designation).
18.

ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 10, at 157.

19.

ld. at 187-90.

20.

Id. at 194-95.

21.

Id.at 122.
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great deal to offer the study of the interracial family. 22 This Article thus
suggests a point of intervention for scholars interested in bringing
structuralist insights into the study of race and family. To date, race scholars
have begun to productively deploy structuralism to discuss cumulative racial
disadvantage and the ongoing, racially segregative effects of government
systems and policies. 23 But they have not typically addressed the impact of
such systems on intimate choice and family formation. Likewise, some
scholars have employed structuralism to explore how law shapes our
intimate preferences and opportunities for intimate engagements. 24 Still,
scholars of this very exciting work have not yet engaged as fully as they
might regarding questions of race. This Article contends that these emergent
and somewhat divergent strands of scholarship can nevertheless be brought
together in ways that expand our thinking about race, intimacy, and family.
According to Our Hearts offers a springboard for scholarly contributions
trained more specifically on race and the role of government and other
institutions in establishing the terms and conditions under which interracial
couples and families can love.
Part II of this Article discusses in more detail those elements of the
Rhinelander trial and aspects of twenty-first century life for interracial
families that lead Onwuachi-Willig to assert that such families operate
within a legal "placelessness"-in a space that does not recognize their
25
interraciality and, in effect, punishes them for being "racial transgressors."
It also explores more closely the claim that existing civil rights law denies
interracial families the protections extended to single-race families26 and
Onwuachi-Willig's concrete proposal to revise employment and housingrelated antidiscrimination provisions in Titles VII and VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 in order to make a "place" for interracial families in
existing law. 27 Part II applauds Onwuachi-Willig's proffered solution, but
argues that According to Our Hearts should ultimately be celebrated for
advancing an agenda even more ambitious than the one acknowledged in its

22.
R.A. Lenhardt, Race Audits, 62 HASTINGS L. 1527, 1540 (2011) [hereinafter Lenhardt,
Race Audits] (citing Michael B. Katz et al., The New African American Inequality, 92 J. AM. HIST.
75, 75-76 (2005)).
23.

Id. at 1540-41 (discussing work of race scholars). This said, we could expand our focus

on such issues even more going forward.
24.
See Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination:The State's Role in the Accidents of Sex
and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1366-73 (2009). See also Russell K. Robinson, Structural
Dimensions of Racial Preferences, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2787 (2008) [hereinafter Robinson,
Structural Dimensions of Racial Preerences] (bringing a structural lens to racial preferences in
online dating).
25.

See ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 10, at 202.

26.

ld. at 159, 202.

27.

Id. at 264-66.
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pages. It contends that, by discussing issues such as residential segregation
and location, as well as the role of antimiscegenation laws in shaping notions
of the normative family, Onwuachi-Willig provides us with a valuable
sketch of a structuralist approach to research on interracial intimacy and
family. Such an approach is badly needed in legal scholarship, which has not
yet fully interrogated matters of interraciality or the systems and structures
28
that either impede or facilitate interracial intimacy and families.
Part III demonstrates the possibilities that the analysis conducted in
According to Our Hearts holds by offering a brief, structuralism-informed
retelling of aspects of the Rhinelander trial. Onwuachi-Willig properly
points to the trial as a unique example of the ways in which processes of
racial formation, performance, and identification function to shape ideas
about race and normative families. 29 This Part maintains that the trial is very
much a story about race and space, even more than Onwuachi-Willig herself
acknowledges. It can also be read as a tale of how the geographic and social
boundaries that existed in 1920s New York City and its suburbs helped predetermine the extent to which Leonard and Alice Rhinelander could be
considered suitable mates. Ultimately, it is also a narrative of how those
boundaries made it impossible for the all-white jury and the millions
following the trial through tabloid and news reports to see Alicenotwithstanding the fact that she identified primarily as white-as anything
other than black. In advancing this alternative rendering of the Rhinelander
saga, I draw on information about race relations in New York City and New
Rochelle, New York, the suburb where Alice and her family lived, and
where she and Leonard first met.3" I also rely on research addressing
"locked-in" racial segregation 31 and the problem of "racial territoriality"
introduced by Professor Elise Boddie in her important 2010 law review
2
article titled Racial Territoriality.3
Thinking about Rhinelander as a story about race and space further
underscores the importance of that case in legal history. It also builds
support for the "structural turn" that I advocate in legal scholarship in this
area by demonstrating that a serious focus on the effect of legal systems and
structures in this context offers insights that other kinds of analysis simply

28.

See supra pp. 102-03.

29.

See ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 10, at 48-52.

30.

Id. at 27.

31.

See Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-In Model of Discrimination,86

VA. L. REV. 727, 787-88 (2000) (setting forth a model suggesting that "racial disparity [and
segregation) may be locked into the market even in the absence of ongoing intentional
discrimination or racism").
32.

Elise C. Boddie, Racial Territoriality,58 UCLA L. REV. 401 (2010).
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do not produce.33 In recognition of these benefits, Part IV asks what a more
intentional and sustained focus on structural racial discrimination and its
impact on interracial couples and families would look like. After briefly
surveying existing research on structuralism by scholars in both the race and
intimacy contexts, it provides a rough sketch of how structuralist concerns
could be integrated into legal research on interracial intimacy and families.
Part V concludes the Article by suggesting the advantages that a focus on
structuralism might have for the study of race and family more generally.
II.

CREATING A "PLACE" FOR INTERRACIAL FAMILIES

Legal scholars have devoted insufficient attention to the connection
between interracial intimacy and location, or in Onwuachi-Willig's terms,
place.34 Of course, the forced exile of Mildred and Richard Loving from the
small town and state where they grew up-chronicled in the film discussed
at this Article's outset-highlighted this issue in a unique way. Richard
Loving also famously did so in urging his lawyer just before the Supreme
Court oral argument to "tell the Court I love my wife, and it is just unfair
that I can't live with her in Virginia." 35 But there are a host of other ways in
which the importance of location or place goes unnoticed in existing
scholarship.
Inquiries into de jure segregation and the extent to which the legal rules
and norms of segregated space helped to facilitate or impede the formation
of the loving relationships at the heart of Loving and other landmark cases
remain shockingly rare. 36 We typically do not ask which factors caused
Richard and Mildred Loving's small Virginia town to have such greatly
relaxed segregative norms. 37 According to Our Hearts, however, suggests
that we should. It calls for an interrogation of the full range of forces that
have and still do keep interracial couples apart, as well as those that bring
them together.
Even as Onwuachi-Willig details the events of the past in exploring the
Rhinelander trial, she strives to focus on modem interracial couples. This

33.
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1,2 (2006).
34.

The work of Renee Romano and some others stands as an important exception, however.

See, e.g., RENEE C. ROMANO, RACE MIXING: BLACK-WHITE MARRIAGE IN POST-WAR AMERICA

14-15 (2003).
35.

WALLENSTEIN, supranote 6, at 215.

36.
But see Emens, supra note 24 (discussing, inter alia, structural impediments to intimacy).
See also Robinson, Structural Dimensions of Racial Preferences, supra note 24 (discussing
structural determinants of racial preferences in online dating).
37.
But see Pratt, supra note 4 (offering personal observations about the social context from
which Richard and Mildred Loving hailed).
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inquiry involves marshalling an impressive array of survey data, social
science research, and narrative, including stories from her own life, to
document the "lingering taboo" of cross-racial loving.38 It also means
introducing concepts such as "collective discrimination," which emphasizes
the joint nature of the injury that interracial couples and families suffer in
our society. 39 As suggested earlier, however, the discussion of
"placelessness" that Onwuachi-Willig conducts arguably stands as the most
important dimension of According to Our Hearts' inquiry into the lives of
twenty-first century interracial families-families that live at a time when
law does not formally prohibit their existence, but nevertheless limits their
ability to flourish on equal terms with monoracial families.4 ° Ultimately,
According to Our Hearts speaks directly to issues of structural
discrimination and exclusion.
In sheer number of pages, According to Our Hearts arguably devotes
the most attention to the problem of placelessness in law. Revealing her
roots as a critical race theorist, Onwuachi-Willig emphasizes the role of law
in "facilitat[ing] the use of race as a determinative [or essential] factor in the
construction of families" through institutions such as marriage or formal
relationships created through legal mechanisms such as adoption. 4 The law,
she argues, essentially "fram[es] . . . the monoracial and heterosexual family
as the normative ideal .... 42 To that extent, it promotes the erasure and
"placelessness" of interracial relationships, especially those that are blackwhite and/or gay or lesbian.43 The privileging of monoraciality and
heterosexuality, and comparative indifference to interraciality and
homosexuality in the intimate realm, Onwuachi-Willig explains, effectively
44
renders multiracial families invisible in the eyes of the law.
Interestingly, Onwuachi-Willig proposes to address this legal
invisibility with more, or at least better, law. Specifically, she proposes that
the term "interraciality" be added to statutes such as Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, which addresses racial discrimination in housing, as a

38.

ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 10, at 143.

39.
Onwuachi-Willig defines "collective discrimination" as "[plunishments for crossing
racially defined boundaries of intimacy." Id. at 199. It "includ[es] but [is) not limited to [forms of]
harassment, the denial of promotions and other advancements, and even the loss or the denial of a
job." Id.
40.

See id. at 156-57.

41.

Id. at 151-53.

42.

Id. at 157.

43.

Id.at 172.

44.

ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 10, at 172.
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way of ensuring the place of interracial families in law.45 As currently
drafted, Title VIII and also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-which
addresses, inter alia, racial discrimination in employment 46-presume the
monoraciality of potential plaintiffs, to the extent that they fail to account
textually for the intersectionality of individual and collective identities.
Onwuachi-Willig's proposal would effect only a modest change in statutory
language. But, it would presumably increase the range of effective civil
rights protections available to multiracial families by referring directly to the
this sense, the
ground on which they, as a unit, experience discrimination. In
47
proposal, while "modest," could produce significant change.
Having said this, the expansion of targeted civil rights protections for
interracial couples may prove to be According to Our Hearts' least
significant scholarly contribution. Proceeding from the proposition that
society should no longer be permitted "to ignore the very social and legal
cues and norms that govem our cross-racial and same-sex interactions," the
book seeks essentially to demonstrate that multiracial families-gay or
straight-are families too. 4 8 Onwuachi-Willig argues that the presumption of
legitimacy accorded to monoracial families should also extend to these
"[r]acial transgressors"; that they too are deserving of respect. 49 In effect,
her real ambition is to change how we think about and conceptualize
interracial couples and families in the United States. According to Our
Hearts seeks to carve out a place for interracial families not only in law, but
in our collective consciousness.
A discussion of residential segregation and the placelessness of
interracial families within our communities, notably, proves to be one of the
most important vehicles in the book for achieving this important goal. In
contrast to other scholars, Onwuachi-Willig seizes immediately on the
spatial dimensions of interracial intimacy in the United States. She confronts
head-on the problem of residential segregation and what it means for
interracial families. 50
Underscoring the extent to which "the lives of Alice and Leonard
Rhinelander remain relevant in today's society," the book documents the
discrimination and dislocation that interracial families face in the housing

45.

Civil Rights Act of 1968, tit. VIII, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at

42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006)); ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 10, at 22.

46.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006)).
47.

ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 10, at 22.

48.

See id. at 157.

49.

Id. at 202.

50.

Id. at 187-203.
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context by briefly returning to the story of the Rhinelander case. 51 Chapter
Six, which introduces the concept of "placelessness," lays out the challenges
that selecting a place to live posed for the couple.5 2 It notes, significantly,
that "Alice and Leonard did not live on their own after their marriagedespite Leonard's wealth and ability to purchase a place for the
newlyweds."5 3 Instead, with one exception, they lived with Alice's parents,
themselves an interracial couple.54 The book suggests that this did not reflect
the couple's preferences so much as their perceptions of "the area's
segregated topography"55 and the realities of "race- and class-segregated
New York."' 56 Alice and Leonard "existed within an American landscape
that had no real, recognized spaces for them and their lives.", 57 They
restricted their housing choices to New Rochelle, New York-a suburb more
diverse than others in the predominantly white Westchester-and, even
more specifically, to the home in which Alice was raised, because they
understood those spaces, in contrast to others in the region, to be ones in
which interraciality was tolerated, if not accepted.58
According to Our Hearts argues that location matters in similar ways
for modem interracial couples. Years after the decision in Loving, interracial
couples and families must engage in the same calculus about "place" or
home that Alice and Leonard applied. Indeed, where to live is a choice with
serious consequences for interracial couples and families.59 Obviously, no
formal laws bar them from settling in a particular area. But According to
Our Hearts makes it clear that they must nevertheless contend with a host of
issues in identifying a place to live. One of these is discrimination. Practices
meant to exclude interracial couples and families from certain residential
areas remain common. 60 The book, for example, briefly examines the
experiences of "John and Vernon, a black-white same-sex couple in a civil
union," whom Onwuachi-Willig interviewed. 6' In seeking a place to live,
they reported having specifically "been steered away from certain

51.

Id.at 121.

52.

Id. at 156-98.

53.

ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supranote 10, at 185.

54.

Id.

55.

Id.

56.

Id.

57.

Id. at 186.

58.

See id. at 185-87.

59.

ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supranote 10, at 173-74.

60.

Id.

61.

Id. at 188.
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neighborhoods because of race, ethnicity, and sexuality." 62
Importantly, the burden imposed upon interracial couples and families
in this area is not limited to discrimination of this sort. Hypersegregated
neighborhoods, where groups such as African Americans and whites are
"uniquely isolated" from one another, also pose a significant problem. 63
64
Such spaces send strong messages about who belongs in certain spaces.
These messages, especially when combined with the physical barriers to
interaction that segregation poses, may "serve as [an] obstacle[] to the initial
meetings between two potential partners that can blossom into long-term,
committed interracial relationships." 65 Even more, they work to limit
significantly the options of those interracial couples and families that
manage to form in spite of de facto segregation.
To the extent that "messages about race, place, and space work to
promote and encourage monoraciality among families," 66 they may
discourage multiracial families from settling in some communities. Parents,
for example, may select a community based in part on the reception that they
think that their multiracial children will receive. Indeed, research indicates
that, like Alice and Leonard, "households headed by [b]lack-[w]hite couples
will avoid the most segregated neighborhoods and congregate instead in
67
places where there is already willingness to traverse racial boundaries."
Lamentably, even the choice of such communities will not ensure full
acceptance and belonging, as demonstrated by the personal story that
Onwuachi-Willig tells about being deemed ineligible for a municipal home
loan program designed to promote diversity because her and her husband's
black-white interracial family would "take the street [on which they sought
to purchase a home] outside of a 60 percent-40 percent, black-white
balance." 68 According to Our Hearts makes it clear that multiracial families
in the twenty-first century must still struggle to "find a space for themselves
' 69
among.., rigid demarcations.
By offering such a full account of the experiences of interracial
families, According to Our Hearts offers real hope that this will one day

62.

Id.

63.

Id.at 124.

64.

Id.
at 187.

65.
ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 10, at 189. In making this point, Onwuachi-Willig draws
explicitly on the work of Renee Romano. See, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 34.
66.

See ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 10, at 189.

67.
Id. at 191 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Richard Wright, Mark Ellis &
Steven Holloway, Where Black-White Couples Live, 32 URB. GEOGRAPHY 1,2 (2011)).
68.

Id. at 193.

69.

Id. at 191.
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change. As previously noted, Onwuachi-Willig does not necessarily describe
herself as engaged in a structuralist inquiry as she devotes attention to the
multiple dimensions of place and placelessness for multiracial couples and
families. But I submit that she should be credited with such an analysis.
According to Our Hearts provides much-needed insight into the embedded
systems and structures that operate to marginalize and discriminate against
interracial couples and families. In doing so, it administers a potent antidote
to the placelessness in the law and residential spaces that interracial couples
and families suffer. An already-accomplished scholar, Onwuachi-Willig
succeeds in offering a preliminary sketch of a structuralism-informed agenda
for legal scholars interested in the role that legal structures and systems play
in limiting opportunities for interracial intimacy. In the Part that follows, I
suggest just one of the avenues that an explicitly structural approach opens
up and the ways in which it could deepen our understanding of interracial
intimacy today.
III. THE

RHINELANDER TRIAL AS A TALE OF RACE AND SPACE

Actor Morgan Freeman caused a firestorm recently when he asserted
that President Barack Obama-whose election to the presidency in 2008 was
widely celebrated as a major civil rights milestone, the fulfillment of
decades of struggle by African-American leaders such as Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr.-is, in fact, not black, but "mixed-race." 70 In a National Public
Radio interview, Freeman said that the
[f]irst thing that always pops into my head regarding our president is
that all of the people who are setting up this barrier for him ...

they

just conveniently forget that Barack had a mama, and she was whitevery white American, Kansas, middle of America .... There was no

argument about who he is or what he is. America's first black
president hasn't arisen yet. He's not America's first black president71
he's America's first mixed-race president.
Interestingly, Freeman's comments resonate deeply with themes
explored by Onwuachi-Willig in According to Our Hearts. They of course
align nicely with the concerns about the invisibility of multiracial identities
in law, but also our collective understanding addressed in the previous Part.
But also underlying Freeman's comments, whether one agrees with them or
not, lies a recognition of the problem of racial identification in American
society. Onwuachi-Willig, as noted earlier, explores this issue in great detail
in her book. The extent to which a black man or woman might not be
70. Morgan Freeman: No Black Presidentfor the U.S. Yet, NPR (July 3, 2012, 3:24 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2012/07/05/156212527/morgan-freeman-no-black-president-for-us-yet.
71.

Id.
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recognized as the parent of their mixed-race child is explored in the book
and highlights the complexity inherent in trying to identify race, as does the
discussion of the Rhinelander trial. Onwuachi-Willig helps her readers see
that the central difficulty presented by Leonard's annulment suit was how to
best identify or understand race. Indeed, the physical examination of Alice's
body by the Rhinelanderjury, 72 the efforts to interrogate Alice's reputation
and circle of associates made by the attorneys involved,73 and the singular
focus on Alice's darker-skinned father's racial lineage-even though she,
like President Obama, also had a "white mama"-while certainly
remarkable within the context of the Rhinelander case, comprise a set of
identification tools that were regularly deployed in race trials dating back to
slavery. 74
In this Part, I want to highlight another matter that could easily have
influenced how Alice's race was identified in the Rhinelander trial-the
question of race and space. As noted in Part II, we so often overlook the
relevance of spatial issues when talking about race and interracial
relationships, in particular. 75 But attention to the interaction of race and
space is key to any structuralist account of race and disadvantage in this
country. In the pages that follow, I seek to demonstrate how a more explicit
commitment to structuralism and the spatial dimensions of race could add
definition to the already vivid picture of the Rhinelander case and modem
interracial relationships that Onwuachi-Willig paints in According to Our
Hearts. I suggest that the realities of race and space in 1920s Westchester
County, while perhaps less sensational than the slave auction-style disrobing
of Alice's body, could easily have influenced the jury's conclusion that
Alice was obviously black.
A. The Problem of RacialSpace
Scholars have increasingly begun to focus on the salience of spatial
concerns in understanding race and cumulative disadvantage in the United
States. Inquiries into racial segregation and its practical consequences for
African Americans and other minorities have been an important dimension

72.

ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 10, at 15.

73.

Seeid. at 45-51.

74.
See id. at 44-45, 54-55. For work on how issues of racial identification played out in
early race trials, see Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Multiracialism and the Social Construction of Race:
The Story ofHudgins v. Wright, in RACE LAW STORIES (Devon W. Carbado & Rachel F. Moran
eds., 2008). For a recent book providing a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see DEVON W.
CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE?: RETHINKING RACE IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA (2013).
75.

See supra pp. 747 53.
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of this work. 76 Over time, however, legal scholars have also begun to focus
on the precise role of law in perpetuating inequality and, most importantly
for the instant discussion, shaping the meaning of racially isolated spaces."
These scholars emphasize the extent to which "law [has] tend[ed] either to
downplay or to overlook the racial identifiability and associated cultural
79
meaning of... space, 78 citing cases such as City of Memphis v. Greene
and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation8°--decisions in which the United States Supreme Court
declined to find actions such81as road closings or exclusionary zoning policies
constitutionally actionable.
Professor Elise Boddie's article Racial Territorialityprovides a useful
example of this body of scholarship. Professor Boddie argues that
antidiscrimination law should be retooled to take account of the full range of
racial harms that attend the exclusion of blacks and other racial minorities
from predominately white geographical spaces. 82 In particular, it asserts that
the existing doctrine "should place significant emphasis on the 'whiteness'
of a subject space in judging racial discrimination claims that involve the
spatial exclusion of people of color." 83 Boddie contends that incidents such
as the 2005 exclusion of hundreds of primarily black Hurricane Katrina
survivors by police officers from the town of Gretna, Louisiana are not
necessarily what they appear to be on the surface. 84 Existing doctrine would
not treat the decision by police officers to block black refugees from passing
over the bridge that would have permitted them safely to escape the postKatrina devastation of New Orleans as constitutionally problematic, despite

76.
See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 261 (2006); Daira
Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 197 (2004).
77.
Boddie, supra note 32; Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political
Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1849 (1994); john a. powell, Structural
Racism: Building upon the Insights of John Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 791, 796 (2008) [powell,
StructuralRacism].

78.

Boddie, supra note 32, at 405 (emphasis added).

79.

City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981).

80.

Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).

81.

See Boddie, supra note 32, at 414-20.

82.

Id. at 405-07.

83.

Id. at 405-06.

84.
Id. at 405. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, hundreds of storm evacuees from New
Orleans, the vast majority of them African American, sought refuge in neighboring towns and
suburbs. But they were often met with opposition by authorities reluctant to admit the crowds into
their jurisdictions. Gardiner Harris, Police in Suburbs Blocked Evacuees, Witnesses Report, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/10/national/nationalspecial/1Oemt.html?_

4=0. See also Boddie, supra note 32, at 402-03 (discussing exclusion of black evacuees from
Gretna, Louisiana).
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the fact that some of the police officers vowed that "[Gretna's] West Bank
was not going to become New Orleans and there would be no Superdomes in
their city."' 85 In effect, the absence of overtly racial language or race-based
decision-making would immunize the officers from judicial sanction. But, as
Boddie argues, the Supreme Court's emphasis on intentionality in its race
cases overlooks the racial character and meaning of our geographic spaces,
ensuring that certain racially exclusionary actions can occur without
recourse. 86 The hypersegration that exists in the United States effectively
87
means that geographic references, by definition, function as racial codes.
Statements like the ones made by the Gretna officers thus necessarily
communicate racial meaning, if not a desire to protect predominantly white
spaces from infiltration by non-whites, in ways that exclude and impose
significant harms on racial minorities.
Notably, Racial Territoriality, which draws heavily on social science
research, advances an understanding of racial space very relevant to
Onwuachi-Willig's study of Rhinelander v. Rhinelander and interracial
couples and families. It conceives of "racialized spac[e] ...[as] more than a

physical set of boundaries or associations." 8 8 Such space functions as a
signifier of racial identity and cultural norms. 89 Where "they are inhabited,
occupied, or frequented principally by one race and are claimed or treated as
spaces that are only for individuals from that racial group," 90 geographic
spaces like predominantly white Gretna or predominantly black New
Orleans communicate information about the people who inhabit them and
91
serve to "reinforce cultural norms about spatial belonging and power."
They serve to "make" race, to cast certain categories and imposed identities
as "natural" or preordained, 92 and to "reinforce racial attitudes and
' 93
prejudices."
To the extent that geographic space can not only structure opportunities

85.
Boddie, supra note 32, at 402 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Aaron
Sharockman, Neighboring Town Denied Evacuees, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Sept. 17, 2005),
http://www.sptimes.com/2005/09/17/Worldandnation/Neighboring-town-deni.shtml).
86.

See id. at 421-22.

87.

See id. at 409-10.

88.

Id. at 438.

89.

Id.

90.

Id. at 449.

91.

Boddie, supra note 32, at 438.

92.
David R. James, The Racial Ghetto as a Race-Making Situation: The Eficts of'
ResidentialSegregation on Racial Inequalities and Racial Identity, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 407,
420 (1994).
93.

Id.at412.
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based on race, as Onwuachi-Willig discusses at length in Chapter Six, but
identify race in some measure, it makes sense to consider here the role that
racial space might have had in the Rhinelander trial itself. The section that
follows begins that process. It engages in a brief structural analysis designed
to highlight aspects of the racial terrain of 1920s Westchester County that
could have been salient to jurors' assessments of Alice's claim of blackness.
B. The Operation ofRace and Space in the Rhinelander Trial
According to Our Hearts' vivid description of the Rhinelander trial
makes it plain that the jurors tasked with deciding the facts pertinent to
Leonard Rhinelander's annulment suit had a variety of evidence to consider
in assessing the veracity of Leonard's claim that he had been deceived about
the true nature of his wife's racial background. The trial record shows that,
in addition to "Alice's bare body," 94 this evidence encompassed love letters
96
95
exchanged by Alice and Leonard during their courtship, photographs,
testimony about their social relationships, and information about the family
ancestry. 97 It also included official documents such as the couple's marriage
license, birth certificates, driver's licenses, and naturalization papers, which
were proffered to prove biological race. 98 Here, I want to suggest that it also
included informal cultural information about the geographic space that Alice
inhabited as a woman of color.
Of course, we can never know with certainty the ways in which cultural
knowledge of geographic space might have informed the task of racial
identification with which the Rhinelander jurors were charged. Even if we
had the opportunity to interview one of the white men empanelled on the
jury in that trial, it is not entirely clear that they could talk at length about the
meaning of racial space or the factors influencing their assessment of Alice's
racial identity. The "subtle biases [serve to] create[] and recreate[]...
racialized environmental feedback loop[s] that, although often. . . acutely
experienced" by minorities and non-minorities alike, 99 are often
"unconscious." 00
The point of the following exercise is not to state definitively the ways
in which racial space affected the results in Rhinelander. Rather, it is to

94.

ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 10, at 13.

95.

Id.at4.

96.

Id.
at45.

97.

Id.
at46.

98.

Id.at44.

99.

Boddie, supra note 32, at 446 (internal quotation marks omitted).

100.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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suggest ways in which geographic considerations might have played a role
in those proceedings. In so doing, this Part seeks, once again, to demonstrate
the potential of analyses explicitly focused on structural concerns when it
comes to interraciality and questions of racial identification.
At first blush, the nature of race relations within New Rochelle, New
York-the place where Alice grew up and Leonard briefly made his homemight raise questions about the value of the geographic inquiry proposed.
Onwuachi-Willig highlights spaces of racial fluidity and diversity within
New Rochelle when discussing Alice's family, housing options in the area,
and the purported frequency with which Alice and others were reported to
socialize across racial lines. 10 But the possible existence of such spaces in
no way undermines the contention that, overall, boundaries within the
hamlet were racialized. The "racial identity of space-how it is perceived by
those who inhabit, occupy, or claim it and those who do not-is contingent
and subject to competing interpretations."' 0 2 In other words, a "city's racial
image is not necessarily uniform .... "103 As Boddie noted in discussing the
Gretna, Louisiana incident mentioned earlier, "despite the prevailing image
of New Orleans as identifiably black, closer examination might reveal a
more complex and nuanced interpretation of the city's racial geography.
Different New Orleans neighborhoods, for example, might convey different
racial meaning and have different racial associations." 10 4 A city's racial
identity, because "it is . . . internally . . . managed according to the
'0 5
circumstances ... is [necessarily] context-dependent."'

Further, even the examples of racially fluid social boundaries properly
noted in According to Our Hearts do not suggest that New Rochelle-a
middle-to-working-class town that sits in Westchester County, 0 6 one of the
nation's first "subdivided suburban archipelago[es]"1' 7-was somehow
immune from the racial systems and prejudices of the day. In the early
decades of the twentieth century, localities throughout the North grappled
openly with how best to deal with the exodus of black people who left the
South as part of the Great Migration. Many of them resorted to exclusionary
zoning and other measures to maintain their jurisdictions as predominantly

101.

See ONWUACFIl-WILLIG, supra note 10, at 185.

102.

Boddie, supra note 32, at 450.

103.

Id.

104.

Id. (citations omitted).

105.

Id. at 450-51.

106.

Daniel Denvir, Segregation in the Land of Limousine Liberalism, SALON.COM (July 1,

2011, 12:01 PM), http://www.salon.com/2011/07/01/denvir-westchester-segregation/.
107.

Id.
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white. 118 This was especially true of New York City, a major receiving
center for black migrants. Even as the Harlem Renaissance kicked into high
gear, "New York's answer to the problems created by the new migration into
the city was the confinement of Negroes
to Harlem and the system of
09
housing segregation we know today."
Dynamics within the larger New York region were no different.
Westchester County-a destination spot for white elites eager for suburban
living since the nineteenth century-was (and, according to some, remains)
relentless in the use of exclusionary measures designed to exclude blacks
and retain the white racial character of towns such as Scarsdale and Rye." 0
Racially-restrictive covenants served to keep African Americans and other
minorities out of local neighborhoods,"' as the discussion of Ridgway v.
Cockburn"12 -a
case concerning a racially restrictive covenant that
highlights the problems inherent in racial identification efforts' 3-that I
conducted in an earlier article attests." 4 Similarly exclusionary zoning
ordinances, building code provisions, and other segregative mechanisms
operated either to exclude minorities from the county entirely or to corral
them into certain areas." 5 Between the years 1910 and 1925, "[m]ost
minorities in Westchester County . . . lived in [places like] southwest
Yonkers and in the nearby cities of New Rochelle, Mount Vernon, and
White Plains."" 6 Perhaps not surprisingly, these areas remain among the

108.
See Priscilla A. Ocen, The New Racially Restrictive Covenant: Race, Welfare, and the
Policingof Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1540, 1542 (2012) (discussing
use of racially restrictive covenants during migration of blacks from the South to the North). For an
excellent treatment of the Great Migration, see ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS:
THE Epic STORY OF AMERICA'S GREAT MIGRATION (2011).

109.
Herbert Shapiro, The Ghetto Is Not Eternal, 27 PHYLON 303, 304 (1966) (reviewing
GILBERT OSOFSKY, HARLEM: THE MAKING OF A GHETTO (1965)). Significantly, residential
segregation of African Americans existed in some northern communities well before the flow of
black migrants from the South intensified. Id.
110.

Denvir, supra note 106.

111.

See id.

112.

Ridgway v. Cockburn, 296 N.Y.S. 936 (Sup. Ct. 1937).

113.
As I explained in a 2008 book chapter on Perez v. Sharp, the black defendants in this case
challenged the terms of the racially restrictive covenant at issue in their case on the grounds that the
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who identified as multiracial. Lenhardt, The Story of Perez v. Sharp, supra note 7, at 376-77. 1 return
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claims of racial vagueness in civil rights cases.
114.

See id. at 376-77.

115.

See id.

116.
Peter H. Schuck, Judging Remedies: JudicialApproaches to Housing Segregation, 37
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 325 (2002).
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most heavily black and Latino areas in Westchester. 7 This reality has been
a point of contention in more than one civil rights suit, including a 2009
federal qui tam suit brought against the county for failing to comply with
Fair Housing Act requirements, which resulted in a consent decree to which
the jurisdiction remains bound. 118
One does not have to strain too hard to imagine that the jurors
empanelled in the Rhinelander trial, which was held in Westchester County,
were aware of these dynamics. They easily could have been influenced, even
before seeing Alice's bare breasts, by the racial information that the
boundaries of 1920s Westchester County communicated. As one observer
commented, "[t]he rigidity of [racial and spatial] boundaries [at this time]
signifie[d] that American Negroes are Negroes first, foremost, and
forever." 119
Moreover, even if they were unaware of the interplay of race and space
at the county level, it is quite possible that the Rhinelander jurors
nevertheless understood how race operated within the borders of New
Rochelle itself. While perhaps comparatively more integrated than other
Westchester County jurisdictions, New Rochelle at that time wasnotwithstanding the "place" that Alice and her multiracial family had carved
out for themselves there' 2 0-plainly a town where race not only had social
significance, but was used to mark the boundaries for certain opportunities.
121
For example, the fact that Alice had been employed as a domestic worker
arguably could have helped to identify her as black, rather than white. In an
essay on the Rhinelander case that preceded their 2001 book on the
subject, 22 Earl Lewis and Heidi Ardizzone cited oral histories of black
residents of New Rochelle that help paint a picture of how "consistent [the]

117.
See Jacob Sugarman, Westchester County's Bumpy Road to FairHousing, WESTCHESTER
MAG. (Apr. 18, 2012, 11:34 AM), http://www.westchestermagazine.com/WestchesterMagazine/May
-2012/Westchester-Countys-Bumpy-Road-to-Fair-Housing/.
For a discussion of the suit and a critique of the consent decree, see Robert G. Schwemm,
118.
Overcoming StructuralBarriersto IntegratedHousing: A Back-to-the-FutureReflection on the Fair
HousingAct's "Affirmatively Furthering"Mandate, 100 KY. L.J. 125 (2012). For a discussion of the
use of qui tam suits as a way of enforcing civil rights protections, see Matthew J. Termine,
Promoting Residential Integration Through the Fair Housing Act: Are Qui Tam Actions a Viable
Method of'Enfbrcing "Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing" Violations?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
1367 (2010).
119.
Karl E. Taeuber, The Problem of Residential Segregation, 29 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCt. 101,
105 (1968).
120.

See ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 10, at 204-05.

121.

Id. at 25.

122.
See generally EARL LEWIS & HEIDI ARDIZZONE, LOVE ON TRIAL: AN AMERICAN
SCANDAL IN BLACK AND WHITE (2001) (discussing the Rhinelander v. Rhinelander trial and its
significance).
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pattern of domestic servitude" was during that period. 123 Relaying the
content of those histories, Lewis and Ardizzone wrote:
When asked what kind of work was available to blacks in New
Rochelle, one native New Rochellean, born in 1900, replied that "[i]f
you worked in New Rochelle you did domestic work until about 25
years ago. If you had a chauffeur's job that was considered a top job in
those days." Another remarked that "New Rochelle was never meant
for blacks. Rich families ... hired live-in domestics who discovered
New Rochelle while traveling here to do domestic work." While
European immigrants might expect better opportunities for their
children and grandchildren, African-Americans and black immigrants
found that their employment opportunities continued to be limited in
New Rochelle and elsewhere. 124
Likewise, educational opportunities in New Rochelle appear to have
been circumscribed by race for decades. In 1960, African-American parents
filed a desegregation lawsuit against the local school board that earned New
Rochelle the designation "Little Rock of the North" 25 and produced one of
the first post-Brown v. Board of Education findings of constitutional
violation. 126 Taylor v. Board of Education127 challenged New Rochelle's
maintenance of the Lincoln elementary school as a segregated institution
reserved exclusively for black students. 128 Of course, this lawsuit, which
required the court to consider the constitutional significance of de facto
segregation, 129 came decades after the Rhinelander trial. But the district
court's finding in Taylor that the spatial manipulation that resulted in the
Lincoln School being all-black began in the 1930s arguably brings it within
the ambit of the instant discussion. The racial gerrymandering in which the
district engaged, as well as its operation of a transfer policy that permitted
white, but not black, students to leave Lincoln in favor of predominantly
white schools, demonstrates the extent to which "color spatialization" had
30
become a part of "the metropolitan landscape" of New Rochelle.1
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Earl Lewis & Heidi Ardizzone, A Modern Cinderella: Race, Sexuality, and Social Class
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Structural mechanisms of the sort at issue in Taylor could also have shaded
the perspectives of jurors, possibly even without their knowledge. 131
I could continue along these lines. But I submit that even this limited
inquiry makes the point that an even more explicit focus on structural issues
such as racialized space can add texture to scholarly analyses in this context.
Insights about racial space and other concerns can deepen our understanding
of the processes by which racial identification occurs, and even more
broadly, appreciation of the many challenges faced by interracial couples
and families today. They serve to amplify Onwuachi-Willig's important
observations about interraciality and the interplay of law and social norms
where constraints on interracial couples and families are concerned.
IV. BRINGING "STRUCTURE" TO RESEARCH ON INTERRACIAL INTIMACY
AND FAMILIES

Evidence of the interpretative possibilities of a structuralism-based
analysis admittedly begs the question of what it would practically mean to
integrate structuralist concerns into the study of interracial couples and
families. In this final Part, I briefly consider legal scholarship incorporating
structuralism that could be brought to bear on studies concerning interracial
families and the challenges that they confront in the twenty-first century.
This Part then considers specific topics that legal scholars embracing
structuralist insights could explore as part of an agenda focused on
uncovering the legal systems and structures that contribute to the
"placelessness" of interracial couples and families today.
A. Race-Based StructuralDiscriminationand Intimacy
In a 2011 article entitled Race Audits, I proposed a mechanism for
unpacking the systems and structures that produce and perpetuate racial
disadvantage, called the "race audit."'' 32 In explaining the need for such a
tool, I discussed the calls for the adoption of a structuralist approach in law
by critical race scholars like John Calmore and john a. powell,1 33 as well as
other scholars interested in issues of race and equality, including Susan
Sturm, Tristin Green, and Samuel Bagenstos.1 34 The benefit of a structuralist

131.

See Boddie, supra note 32, at 446.
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Lenhardt, Race Audits, supra note 22. See also R.A. Lenhardt, Localities as Equality
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133.
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approach in law is that it
"shift[s] our attention" from intentionality or "intra-institutional"based analyses-favorites of the current [Supreme] Court-to
interrogations of "inter-institutional arrangements and interactions"
that better explain the cumulative and multi-generational nature of
racial disadvantage. [It] make[s] clear that an exclusive focus on
intentionality, by definition, will always be inadequate to address
persistent racial inequalities. 135
For scholars interested in interracial families, however, the problem
with this still evolving body of research is that it typically has not engaged
with questions of intimacy, let alone interracial intimacy, when discussing
the problems of cumulative racial disadvantage. Professor Russell Robinson
completed a study of racial preferences in online dating that provides an
important exception.136 Notably, Liz Emens's 2009 article, Intimate
Discrimination: The State's Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, does as
well. 37 Emens's article makes a contribution by bringing a structural lens to
a broad range of intimate issues. Emens contends that we should be
concerned about the intimate consequences of "[s]tructural subordination on
the basis of race," as well as its "material consequences." 138 Deploying a
structural lens, she reveals how the state is both active and anything but
neutral in influencing preferences and behaviors in the intimate sphere. She
explains that "[b]y creating the infrastructure of society, the state shapes the
accidents of who meets whom and how," and also "plays a role in the
hierarchy of intimate opportunities by shaping social capital and relative
1 39
advantages."
Importantly, Emens engages in a meaningful study of the sources and
potential solutions for what she terms "intimate discrimination" in the race
context. 140 But Emens's article, which also explores intimate discrimination
on grounds of disability and sex, is not meant to be a deep exploration of
race or the challenges facing interracial intimacy. It seems primarily to
elucidate the state's essentially invisible role in setting intimate preferences
Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 850 (2007); Susan

Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 458,462-63 (2001).
135.

Lenhardt, Localities as Equality Innovators, supra note 132, at 269 (citations omitted).

136.
See generally Robinson, Structural Dimensions of Racial Preferences, supra note 24
(discussing and calling for further research on the impact of structural conditions on intimate
preferences, especially those pertaining to race).
137.
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by conducting a comparative analysis that reveals the nature of government
action and our own assumptions across three important categories. In sum,
the need for legal research that addresses interracial intimacy from an
explicitly structural perspective remains pressing.
B. Identifying StructuralObstacles to InterracialIntimacy and Families
This Article could not begin to map a comprehensive agenda for legal
scholarship trained on structural discrimination in the intimate realm and its
impact on interracial couples and families. Its purpose, in addition to
celebrating According to Our Hearts and the unique contribution that
Onwuachi-Willig makes in its pages, is primarily to suggest the need for
structural analysis in this area and to make clear the possibilities it offers.
That said, this Article would be incomplete without some discussion of what
a structural discrimination-focused research agenda might entail.
Importantly, many of the issues raised by Onwuachi-Willig in the
course of exploring the experiences of interracial couples and families are
ones on which I would also focus. For example, legal scholars need to
address further questions about how race-based intimate preferences get
expressed online and the role of housing policy and policing in shaping
opportunities for families. As previously indicated, I envision a process of
interrogation by race and family law scholars in this area that even more
directly implicates structuralism. The question, of course, is exactly what
such a process would entail.
To begin, we must, taking a page from Onwuachi-Willig's own
playbook, first seek answers to current challenges by better understanding
the past. Despite the concern that I earlier expressed about the almost
singular focus on antimiscegenation law, I would encourage scholars to
reexamine bans on interracial intimacy, but to do so in a way that highlights
the structural implications of such prohibitions. The previously-mentioned
research of Professor Reginald Oh regarding segregation could be a natural
starting point for this kind of work.14 ' So too could judicial cases raising
questions about the link between segregation and attitudes toward crossracial intimacy.
Consider, for example, the Fourth Circuit's 1930 decision in City of
Richmond v. Deans.142 Deans involved a constitutional challenge to a
Richmond ordinance, the explicit purpose of which was "[t]o prohibit any
person from using as a residence any building on any street between
intersecting streets where the majority of residences on such street are

141.

See generally Oh, supra note 8.
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occupied by those with whom said person is forbidden to intermarry." 143
The ordinance reflected an attempt by Richmond officials to circumvent the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Buchanan v. Warley, 144 which
held that a jurisdiction's police power could not justify unconstitutional,
145
race-based interferences with the "right to own and dispose of property.
That provision, which the Supreme Court ultimately invalidated, was
obviously designed to preserve the racial character and social order of
Richmond's neighborhoods. But it also encompassed other, more ambitious
goals. The ordinance also functioned to reduce the possibility that intimate
relationships like Alice and Leonard's could ever develop. In this sense, the
Richmond ordinance, and others like it enacted across the South, revealed a
not-so-closely-held secret about life in the Jim Crow South. Residential
segregation was about more than the racial identifiability of neighborhoods
and house values. Like antimiscegenation laws, residential segregation
served to punish interracial intimacy and those inclined to form interracial
families at the core of According to Our Hearts.146
We could learn a great deal more by further interrogating the race and
gender subordination effected by race-based "school segregation, . . .
antimiscegenation laws," and segregation more broadly. 147 Even more,
exploring the intersection of antimiscegenation law and other forms of
government discrimination on the basis of race could also be very
productive. Such an inquiry could, for example, identify the ways in which
antimiscegenation and residential segregation laws have not just been
independent, equally important forces in this area, but may actually have
been mutually constitutive of modem-day obstacles to loving in this context.
In this connection, I encourage scholars to examine modem burdens to
interracial intimacy, like employment or housing, and to explore
opportunities to drill down on the systems and structures that enable
discrimination in those realms. In addition to a focus on Title VIII, for
example, we could do more to explore the ongoing implications of
restrictive covenants and exclusionary zoning-like the policies now being
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debated in Westchester County and other areas-for interracial intimacy. 148
And, as Part IV makes clear, legal scholars would do well to focus more on
the problem of spatiality and race, even in the online world. 149 We can
explore the impact that racialized space has in setting intimate preferences
and ask questions about the impact that, for example, policies designed to
regulate those spaces have on the stigmatic meaning accorded to race, as
Bennett Capers does in his work. 5 0
Additionally, we can begin to ask harder questions about the ways in
which issues of space and race influence ideas about interracial families and
parenting. Consider, for example, the problem of black mothers being
mistaken for the nannies of their interracial children, an issue that
Onwuachi-Willig explores in her book, but that has also gotten attention in
popular publications such as Essence Magazine.' 5' The nanny dilemma,
quite clearly, is in part about racial identification and the presumed
naturalness of racial categories, as Onwuachi-Willig notes.' 52 But in a very
real sense, it is also a problem of racial space. The racial identifiability of
some spaces makes it impossible for some to imagine not only that
interracial family configurations exist, but that a black woman would have
any reason but her job as a nanny for being in a predominantly white
neighborhood or area. We need to better understand the reasons why this is
so. At the same time, we also need to comprehend the characteristics of
certain spaces that significantly reduce the likelihood that such a
misidentification occurs. In other words, are there things that might make the
Upper East Side of New York City different than, say, Newark, New Jersey,
or even some of the more racially diverse suburbs that surround it?
Further, scholars interested in questions pertaining to the interracial
family could do more to explicate the concrete harms imposed by
discriminatory laws and policies. Onwuachi-Willig advances the ball
immensely by introducing concepts such as "placelessness" and "collective
discrimination."' 5 3 But more can be done to explicate the burdens imposed.
To wit, scholars could do more to integrate research from other disciplines
into their work. Sociologists, for example, have long adopted a structural
lens in thinking about interracial intimacy. ' Identifying legal systems that
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promote or inhibit cross-racial impact across a range of domains could be
very useful and would complement such work. 55
'
Likewise, much more can be done to identify effective remedies or
solutions for the harms imposed on interracial families. Onwuachi-Willig's
proposal to integrate the term "interraciality" into existing civil rights
provisions carries expressive force and has the benefit of being relatively
simple to implement. 156 But are there other remedies that we might explore?
In a 1981 housing desegregation case, a court mandated the use of
advertisements including blacks as a way of responding to collective
discrimination against such individuals. 157 Likewise, a recent employment
discrimination suit against the clothing store Abercrombie & Fitch resulted
in a settlement requiring more diverse advertising. 158 Are there similar
remedies that could also be adopted? Should we explore more affirmative
measures for encouraging interracial loving in the absence of such
violations? What about social programs that seek to encourage diversity and,
in some cases, to attract interracial couples and families in particular through
housing loan or tax credit offers? Which programs have been most effective?
Which programs, like the initiative from which Onwuachi-Willig and her
husband were excluded, have provisions that actually amplify the
segregative effects on interracial families? 5 9 Legal scholars need to turn
their attention to such issues to develop an understanding of effective
practices and policies in this context.
Finally, scholars concerned about interracial families might benefit
from exploring more closely other types of cross-racial relationships and the
legal structures that inhibit or promote them. Specifically, I contend that
looking at interracial friendships could be an important starting point for
scholars interested in questions of romantic intimacy. Legal scholars have
focused on questions of friendship in recent years. 160 But these studies seem
always to give short shrift to the salience of race. Likewise, fixes for the
comparatively low incidence of interracial marriage, especially black-white
Structure on Opportunitiesfor Interracial Contact: Extending Blau's MacrostructuralTheory, 33
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marriages, often get offered without any thought at all to the problems that
impede the same configuration of friendship. 161 While non-romantic
relationships are, of course, not the same as romantic ones, I maintain that
structural inquiries into barriers to the former could produce important
information about obstacles to the latter.
V. CONCLUSION: EXPANDING RESEARCH ON RACE, PLACE, AND FAMILY

In sum, According to Our Hearts is a triumph. It makes a substantial
contribution to legal scholarship and thinking about interracial couples and
families in the twenty-first century, and secures a place for Rhinelander v.
Rhinelander in the race canon. 162 In this Article, I have attempted to show
that Onwuachi-Willig has also advanced research in this area by making
clear the need for a scholarly focus on structural obstacles to interracial
intimacy. Such an emphasis can greatly enhance our understanding of the
experience and needs of interracial families at a time when interracial
marriage, while perhaps not increasing at the rates one might expect, is on
the rise.
Significantly, Onwuachi-Willig's ambitious study of interracial couples
and families does not pretend to address problems of race and family more
broadly. Those issues fall outside of the purview of According to Our
Hearts. But it bears noting that the structural analysis underlying her
important book also arguably maps out avenues for more directly addressing
the systems and structures that adversely affect how we view families in
general. As I read the portions of the book on housing discrimination and
segregation, in particular, I was reminded of a presentation delivered by two
family advocates whom I invited to speak to my family law class several
years ago. The two women, both white, sought to highlight the different
treatment accorded families who are poor, or black, or Latino by recounting
their own experiences as new mothers. While their class status and racial
identity ordinarily would not subject either woman to stigma or, more
importantly, increased scrutiny by state agencies, the fact that one woman
lived in a racially-identifiable neighborhood in a poor area of New York
City meant that she could not escape the adverse treatment that families of
color suffer at the hands of child welfare agencies and other state
63
agencies. 1
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Upon giving birth to her child, this woman received a visit from child
welfare officials designed to determine whether she utilized drugs, had
secured child care for her infant, and had sufficient food to ensure its
development. In contrast, her colleague, who gave birth to a child around the
same period, but lived in an upper-class, predominantly white neighborhood
in another part of the city, received no similar visit. Together, her class, race,
and spatial location rendered her a presumptively fit parent, while her coworker, by dint of the racial identity and class status of those families among
whom she lived, was regarded as something much less than that.
The point I make here is not that all state involvement in families is
problematic. Clearly, that is not the case. The point of this intervention is
simply to highlight that spatiality and the negative messages about race
communicated by certain systems and structures have salience outside the
interracial family context on which Onwuachi-Willig rightfully focuses our
attention. Structural concerns apply with equal force in the context of
monoracial families and extend to questions bearing on the ability of
families of all backgrounds to flourish.'6 Legal scholars would do well to
internalize this reality in examining some of the questions of race and family
addressed in this Article, as well as in Professor Onwuachi-Willig's
excellent book.
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